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Abstract: The interpretation of religious texts and artifacts—known as 
hermeneutics or exegesis—is a core part of religious practice. Nevertheless, 
biocultural models of religion largely neglect it. Here, we offer a framework 
for how foundational research might be initiated in this important area. 
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Though biocultural theories of religion have successfully accounted for the content of 
religious belief in terms of human cognitive architecture and general evolutionary 
principles (Atran, 2002; Barrett, 2000; Boyer, 2008; Irons, 2001; Sosis, 2005), they 
say very little about the propensity to interpret religious content. This is a significant 
omission, given that much of the activity of mature religious practice consists of 
extracting the allegorical, analogical and metaphorical meanings that are believed to 
reside in religious objects (Ricœur, 1995). We maintain here that this activity—
variously termed ‘hermeneutics’ or ‘exegesis’—needs to be included in the project of 
naturalizing religious beliefs if it is to achieve the comprehensiveness it aspires to. 
Further, we argue that not doing this does the field a disservice, insofar as it supplies 
critics with the easy objection that biocultural approaches—whatever their value for 
analyzing ‘superstition’—are inadequate to the demands of ‘sophisticated’ religious 
belief (Feser, 2015). 
 How might one operationalize the ambition of making sophisticated interpretations 
of religious materials amenable to cognitive science? We propose that a program of 
research based on the following four questions might cast important light on the 
naturalistic basis of exegetical behavior. Religion, of course, is an inherently complex 
phenomenon and we accept that each of our questions will also reflect on non-
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religious behaviors. However, given that two of the questions involve assigning 
intentions to a believed-in counterfactual agent, when the other two focus on the 
propensity to create and search for suprapersonal meanings, our view is that their 
aggregate effect is to circumscribe an identifiably religious activity.    
 
1—What does religious exegesis do? One account holds that it reads ‘through or 
around the literal meaning of the words in order to discern their more significant 
“spiritual” meaning’ (Healy, 2006, p. 7). In other words, its purpose is to infer the 
intentions of an absent or virtual divine agent from a set of non-explicit cues. 
Naturally, this undertaking will also reflect historical pressures: an interpretation need 
not be sincere, and can be framed to benefit (or disadvantage) specific social actors 
(Caspary, 1979); equally, its purpose might be to protect scriptural authority from 
disconfirmation by events (Horton, 1967). Nevertheless, the general form of 
exegetical activities remains the same, and superficially resembles the agency 
detection strategies identified in Guthrie (1993) and Gray & Wegner (2010). The 
main difference is that where the perceptual registration of an agent comes for ‘free’ 
(Gallagher, 2008), the most basic scriptural exegesis requires at least level three 
theory of mind (ToM) (‘I believe that the prophets didn’t know that God intended 
them to communicate hidden meanings’)—with even more levels supervening when it 
comes to assessing the interpretations of others. Two predictions follow from these 
considerations. Firstly, exegetical ability should scale with ToM—i.e. clerical and 
theological interpreters should perform better on tests measuring the ability to track 
nested mental states like those developed in Kinderman, Dunbar, & Bentall (1998). 
Secondly, relevance theory suggests that textual cues imposing a moderate cognitive 
burden will cue greater interpretive efforts than either simple cues or overly difficult 
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ones (Sperber & Wilson, 1995; Sperber, 2010). (For instance, unrepresented vowels 
in Torah scrolls both facilitate and limit interpretive freedom, just as illuminated 
bibles like the Book of Kells stimulate attention by simultaneously engaging and 
frustrating schematic perception.) We propose that collaborating with colleagues in 
cognitive social psychology and experimental linguistics to test these predictions 
concerning the interaction between ToM abilities and textual features will generate 
foundational insights into religious interpretation by clarifying its underlying 
function. 
 
2—Why do we engage in religious exegesis? Though scriptural exegesis is obviously 
the prerogative of literate societies with developed doctrines, the widespread 
interpretation of historical events in religious terms by way of divination, augury and 
other like practices points to a deeper foundation for exegetical activities (Raphals, 
2013). Though this does not mean they were selected for by evolution, it does pose 
the question as to whether exegetical activities are directly informed by an evolved 
competency. Our response is that the ‘social brain’ hypothesis allows exegetical 
activities to be situated in an evolutionary framework in a nonreductive way (Dunbar 
& Shultz, 2007; Dunbar, 1992; Humphrey, 1976). This hypothesis holds that a major 
driver in the evolution of the human neocortex was the need to develop processing 
power adequate to the needs of large-group sociality (Dávid-Barrett & Dunbar, 2013). 
Clearly, a facility for inferring the intentional state of non-present agents would be 
advantageous in this scenario—and thus a selection pressure may have existed for the 
cognitive mechanisms that support exegetical activity. While it is impossible to test 
this claim directly, agent-based models would cast light on whether or not it is 
plausible. Initial steps towards this end can be found in Dávid-Barrett & Carney 
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(2015); we propose here that a sustained collaboration between network scientists, 
evolutionary psychologists and paleoanthropologists may generate further predictions 
concerning the origin of exegesis that can be tested against the empirical record. 
 
3—Is there a neural mechanism underwriting exegetical activities? One active 
research tradition in the biocultural approach to religion centers on identifying the 
neural basis of religious experience (D’Aquili & Newberg, 1999; Lewis-Williams, 
2010; Saver & Rabin, 1997). We suggest that work on the ‘salience disorder’ 
paradigm in the understanding of schizophrenia offers a promising possibility for 
extending this program to exegesis (Barkus et al., 2014; Kapur, Mizrahi, & Li, 2005; 
Winton-Brown, Fusar-Poli, Ungless, & Howes, 2014). Specifically, this position 
suggests that the propensity to interpret is linked with the dopaminergic system, 
insofar as increased dopamine uptake by D2 receptors in the striatum spurs 
interpretive activity by conferring salience on relevant stimuli. When disordered 
uptake of dopamine results in aberrant salience patterns, psychosis is held to emerge. 
On this view, the propensity to interpret religious materials should scale with 
dopamine uptake. (The converse prediction—that low levels of dopamine should 
cause a drop in exegetical engagement—is partially confirmed in McNamara, Durso, 
& Brown (2006), where dopamine deficient Parkinson’s patients are shown to exhibit 
lower levels of religiosity.) One way to progress the dopamine hypothesis would be to 
collaborate with imaging specialists, and use PET scan technology to investigate 
whether or not high-level interpreters of religious materials have a larger number of 
D2 receptors than the population mean.    
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4—What causes individuals to arrive at, and commit to, specific interpretive 
positions? Given the fraught role played by schism, reformation and heresy in the 
history of organized belief, this question bears directly on religious practice (Evans, 
2008; Fiero, 2013). Recent work in politics suggests that a large portion of ideological 
variation is driven by preexisting dispositions rather than rational decision-making 
(Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009; Haidt, 2013). Equally, there is a body of research 
that identifies the propensity to search for meaning as a trait that exhibits variation 
across the population (Steger, Frazier, Oishi, & Kaler, 2006; Steger, Kashdan, 
Sullivan, & Lorentz, 2008; Steger & Samman, 2012). We propose that, by analogy 
with political affiliation, interpretive commitment in religion may be predicted by 
personality traits. Testing this claim would involve working with personality 
psychologists, and would entail asking a population who have been evaluated on 
measures like the ‘big five’ personality model (McCrae & John, 1992), the ‘disgust 
scale’ (Haidt, McCauley, & Rozin, 1994) and the ‘search for meaning’ scale (Steger 
et al., 2006) to pick a preferred interpretive position from a series of vignettes 
corresponding to generic interpretive positions in theology. We propose that scores on 
all metrics will predict the choices made, thereby showing up both the simple effects 
and the interaction effects of the personality factors that drive interpretive 
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